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A popular myth about South African law for dismissal based on operational 
requirements is that it is unique, unduly onerous on employers and over-regulated. 
The myth is accompanied by the misconception that the consultation provisions of 
the Labour Relations Act
1
 (LRA) put a bar on job creation, efficiency and 
competitiveness and are neither in touch with the global labour market nor in 
alignment with prevailing international labour standards. 
This dissertation tries to dispel the misconceptions surrounding dismissal based on 
operational requirements – an area of labour law seen by many employers as among 
the most onerous in the current dispensation. It will look at mandatory consultation, 
which is perceived by many critics as unduly harsh on employers, from an 
international perspective based on the application of ILO ‘Termination of 
Employment’ Convention 158 (1985), ‘Termination of Employment’ 
Recommendation 166 (1982) and comparative ILO source material based on the 
General Survey of 1995.
2
 
Following the LRA’s step-by-step process for dismissal based on operational 
requirements, the first part of this paper examines the statutory requirement for an 
employer to justify dismissal in terms of s 188(a)(ii) of the Act and asks whether 
South Africa’s law is unique and out of alignment with that of its global competitors. 
Then, focusing on the loosely-worded definition of operational requirements 
(under s 213 of the LRA), part two of this paper, examines the concept’s originality 
with reference to the relevant ILO standards and the law in other countries. It seeks 
to establish whether South Africa’s definition of the concept, so often in need of 
judicial clarification, is more onerous than those of other jurisdictions or just a clone 
of international labour standards.  
Turning to the most controversial aspect of such dismissal legislation – the 
obligation to consult outlined in s 189(2) of the LRA – part three of this paper looks 
                                               
1
 Act 66 of 1995. 
2
 ILO Termination of Employment Digest: A Legislative Review (2000) Geneva, International Labour 
Office.  
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at legislation from other countries to contextualize the ‘should we or shouldn’t we 
consult’ debate and examines whether a new generation of rights has emerged since 
the 1990s. It questions whether the LRA’s obligation to consult is unduly onerous 
for employers or a legal duty implemented, in different ways, around the world.  
Moving to the substantive detail of the consultation requirements of the LRA in 
s 189(3)(a)-(j), part four of this paper joins in the current debate on the consultation 
procedure’s suitability for small employers. It assesses the merits of the allegedly 
unduly onerous step-by-step process for small and medium-sized enterprises and 
questions the wisdom of selective application and special Codes of Practice 





 and Anton Roskam.
5
  
Parts five to eight of this paper, consider the legislative flexibility for employers to 
reach their desired goals through the ‘meaningful joint consensus-seeking process’ 
envisaged by s 189(2) of the LRA.
6
  
Part five looks at measures taken around the world to avoid or minimise dismissals 
based on operational requirements (a requirement of s 189(2)(a)(i)-(ii) of the LRA). 
In particular, it considers innovative ways of finding alternatives to retrenchment. It 
also reviews the current debate on whether such dismissal should only be used as a 
last resort.  
Part six compares national measures to mitigate the adverse effects of such 
termination, a requirement under LRA s 189(2)(a)(iii)-(iv),
7
 with the legislation of 
other jurisdictions. For example, the obligation to rehire a retrenched employee – 
required in some jurisdictions – is far more onerous for employers than the 
                                               
3
 Cheadle Halton, Regulated Flexibility: Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA (December 2006) 
unpublished concept paper. 
4
 van Niekerk André, Regulating Flexibility and Small Business: Revisiting the LRA and BCEA. A 
Response to Halton Cheadle’s Concept Paper (March 2007) Development Policy Research Unit 
07/119. 
5
 Roskam Anton, An Exploratory Look into Labour Market Regulation (January 2007) Development 
Policy Research Unit 07/116. 
6 It should be stressed that the issue of written notice inviting the other party to consult under s 189 (3) 
of the LRA requires the employer to have already done some considerable soul-searching before the 
parties meet for consultation. 
7
 LRA s 189(2)(a)(iii): to change the timing of the dismissals; s 189(2)(a)(iv): to mitigate the adverse 
effects of the dismissals.  
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obligation to consider ‘the possibility’ of rehiring a worker, which is the legal 
requirement in South Africa.
8
 
Part seven evaluates the flexibility of selection criteria under s 189(2)(b) of the 
LRA
9
 for employers to make the retrenchment decisions of their choice, and 
examines the scope available under the ILO instruments and the laws of other 
countries to protect the most vulnerable workers.   
Part eight of this paper compares severance pay under s 189(2)(c) of the LRA
10
 and  
s 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
11
 with that in other jurisdictions. 
Using extensive data from the ILO Termination of Employment Digest, this section 
provides statistical evidence to prove that the financial burden of retrenchment for 
South Africa’s employers is significantly lower than in many other jurisdictions. 
(While debate comparing the legislative provisions for extended notice pay in 
different jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this paper, ILO data is provided in 
Annexure 6.)  
Part nine, the final part of this dissertation, looks at notification of the 
administrative authorities –  an international obligation in many countries for 
collective dismissals but not a statutory requirement in South Africa except in the 
case of miners (under s 52 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act of 2002). This part of the paper seeks to dispel the myth of over-regulation in 
South Africa by contrasting the flexibility afforded South Africa’s employers under 
the LRA with more onerous legal requirements in other countries.  
1. Justification 
The need for an employer to justify a dismissal decision is not unique to South 
Africa. Key to international law on the termination of employment is that employees 
have the right not to be unfairly or unjustifiably dismissed.
12
 The LRA appropriates 
its terminology, concepts and ingenuity on grounds for dismissal from the 
International Labour Organisation circa 1985. Indeed, s 188 of the LRA, is adopted 
                                               
8
 LRA s 189(3)(h): the possibility of the future re-employment of the employees who are dismissed. 
9
 LRA s 189(2)(b): the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed; LRA s189 (3)(d): the 
proposed method for selecting which employees to dismiss. 
10 LRA s189(2)(c): the severance pay for dismissed employees; s 189(3)(f) the severance pay 
proposed.   
11
 Act 75 of 1997. 
12
 Rubin Neville, Code of International Labour Law; Law, Practice & Jurisprudence, vol 2,  
book 1 (2005) 485 at para 1. 
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almost verbatim from ILO ‘Termination of Employment’ Convention 158 and its 
accompanying ILO Recommendation 166. Article 4 of ILO Convention 158 states: 
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid  
reason for such a termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the  




The LRA’s s188 uses identical grounds for dismissal as the Convention (see words 
highlighted in bold):  
(1) A dismissal that is not automatically unfair, is unfair if the employer fails  
to prove –  
(a) that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason 
(i)  related to the employee’s conduct or capacity; or 
(ii) based on the employer’s operational requirements and 
(b)  that the dismissal was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. 
 
The main variation between the two instruments is that the LRA uses the word 
‘fair’ and the ILO Convention uses the word ‘valid’. The Cambridge Dictionary 
defines valid as ‘based on truth or reason’ and fair as ‘treating someone in a way that 
is right or reasonable’. Although it could be argued that the LRA’s fair is more 
subjective and onerous for employers than the ILO Convention’s valid, experience 
shows that the word fair has not proved an obstacle to South African business.
14
  
Extensive data from the Termination of Employment Digest (2000) produced by 
the ILO in Switzerland, reveals that South Africa’s grounds for justification of unfair 
dismissal are consistent with those of the majority of countries. For example whether 
the reason for dismissal is ‘valid’ (ILO Convention 158, Article 4), ‘fair’ as in South 
Africa (s 188 LRA) or on ‘well-founded and on valid grounds’ as in France (s L122-
3-8, Labour Code, 1974),
15
 the culture of justification is an international norm.
16
  
                                               
13
 See Annexe 1: ILO ‘Termination of Employment’ Convention, No 158 (1985); ILO ‘Termination 
of Employment’ Recommendation, No 166 (1982).   
14
 The only other variation between the LRA s 188(1)(a) and ILO Convention 158, Art 4, is that the 
Convention uses the words ‘connected with’ the conduct or capacity of the worker while the LRA 
uses ‘related to’ the employees conduct or capacity. ‘Connected with’ means to be ‘joined with 
something else’ while ‘related to’ means ‘to find or show the connection between two or more things’. 
It is debatable whether the looser wording of the LRA affords employees any more protection than the 
ILO instrument: citing Cambridge Dictionary Online. 
15
 ILO Digest, op cit (note 2) at 147.  
16
 The rise of the labour movement, industrial unrest and the growing recognition of the need to 
protect workers prompted a change in the thinking of legislators, who, at the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, started to modify the substantive provisions of regulation in this area: idem at 9. 
 7 
The right not to be unfairly dismissed can be seen in most national legal systems, 
albeit in different forms. In some countries, it is given the status of a constitutional 
right. For example, the Mexican Constitution established in 1917 that dismissal 
should be based on ‘valid’ reasons.
17
 In Latin America, 13 out of 20 national 
constitutions have incorporated labour rights as fundamental rights – Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. 
Section 23 of the South African Constitution, 1996, includes the right to fair labour 
practices, which incorporates the right not to be unfairly dismissed. Section 39(1) of 
the Constitution requires the courts or arbitrations to ‘consider international law’ 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights. The courts have had recourse to ILO 
Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 when interpreting the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed, although it should be emphasised that South Africa has not 




While the analysis above shows that the grounds for justification of dismissal in 
South Africa are consistent with those in most other jurisdictions, Article 4 of the 
ILO Convention is more rigorously applied in South Africa because of the wide 
scope of who is an employee under the LRA. However, experience shows this has 
not opened the floodgates to claims of unfair dismissal. South Africa follows 
international best practice in terms of its broad definition of employee. It should be 
emphasised that the LRA covers all employees in both the public and private sectors, 




The consequence of limiting the scope of the LRA means that there is no statutory 
remedy for unfair dismissal if an employee falls within the excluded categories.
20
 
                                               
17
 ILO Digest, op cit at 9.  
18
 See Annexure 2. List of 34 countries which have ratified Convention 158 with dates:  Antigua 
and Barbuda, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil (denounced), Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Republic of Moldova, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Slovenia,  
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia: ILO. 
19
 LRA s 213: An ‘employee’ is defined as ‘any person, excluding an independent contractor, who 
works for another person or for the State and who receives or is entitled to receive any remuneration’. 
20
 In addition to the LRA definition of ‘employee’, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997 – which deals with minimum periods of notice and severance pay - is similarly limited except 
 8 
However, because s 23(1) of the national Constitution entrenches the right to fair 
labour practices for ‘everyone’, the unfair dismissal of such an employee may give 
rise to a constitutional claim.
21
 
In other countries where the right to justify dismissal is created by statute, for 
example in the United Kingdom, there is no statutory remedy for unfair dismissal 
until an employee has served a qualifying period of one year.
22
 While this allows 
employers greater flexibility to hire and fire, the provision is offset by greater 
protection for the worker in the form of social security benefits.
23
  
However, the existence of regulation does not ensure its practical application. In 
France,
24
 a country which ratified ILO Convention 158 in 1989, an ILO complaint 
against new contracts of employment (referred to as CNEs) was received last year 
for inter alia breaching Article 4 of ILO Convention 158. The CNEs allow employers 
to dismiss employees under the age of 26 without a valid reason.
25
 
While dismissal law may be more rigorously applied in South Africa than in some 
other countries, also because of recourse to the CCMA, the LRA justification for 
dismissal (under s 188) is in alignment with most other jurisdictions, which use the 
same ILO template that requires an employer to justify a dismissal decision on 
grounds of ‘conduct’, ‘capacity’ or ‘operational requirements’.  
There are only a handful of countries where an employer does not need to justify a 
dismissal, for example, Austria, Belgium and the United States.
26
 In the USA, no 
legislative mechanism exists for unfair dismissal. The employment relationship is 
                                                                                                                                     
that there is an additional general limitation of scope (regarding unpaid volunteers working for 
charitable organisations) and several specific limitations for merchant seamen (only the provisions on 
severance pay apply). Moreover, the BCEA does not apply to people receiving vocational training to 
the extent that their terms and conditions are regulated by other laws; and employees who work less 
than 24 hours a month (s 36 of BCEA). 
21
 ILO Digest, op cit at 300. 
22 In the UK, the qualifying period has recently been reduced from two years to one year. 
23
 It is also worth noting that during the economic expansion of the 1960s and 1970s, a number of 
European countries introduced statutory restrictions on the termination of certain workers such as 
shop stewards: Digest, idem at Part I. 
24 The restriction of dismissal ‘without cause’ was gradually broadened in countries whose legal 
systems were based on the Napoleonic Code and by the 1940s most states within this legal tradition 
had introduced legislation on the justification of dismissal that required notice and severance pay: 
idem at 9 (See Annexure 3). 
25 ILO, Governing Body, Sixth Supplementary Report: Report of the committee set up to examine the 
representation alleging non-observance by France inter alia of the Termination of Employment 
Convention 1982 (No158) made under article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederation 
Générale du Travail Force Ouvrière, (November 2007): See Annexure 3. 
26 ILO Digest, ibid. 
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considered to be ‘at the will’ of the parties. However, since the 1970s, the courts in 
the US have restricted the use of ‘at will’ powers
27
 to bring national law more into 
alignment with international labour standards.
28
  
2. The definition of operational requirements 
The definition of operational requirements (s 213, LRA) as requirements based on 
‘the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer’ provides 
ample elasticity for South African employers to make the business changes of their 
choice – ranging from basic viability to abundant profit  –  and can be regarded as 
one of the least onerous aspects of the Act.
29
 
The LRA definition is so broad that the concept has almost become an expedient 
open to abuse, according to Clive Thompson. All an employer need do is re-classify 
a demand as an operational requirement
30
 and he or she can transform collective 
bargaining into a consultation about retrenchment.
31
  
However, international research reveals that the original concept of operational 
requirements was never defined, only explained at an ILO Conference 27 years ago 
and then incorporated into the South African statute. What is intriguing is why a 
concept as important as operational requirements was left undefined by the ILO in 
Convention 158 and no guidelines provided in Recommendation 166.
32
 Only a report 
presented for discussion at an ILO conference in 1981 (a year before the 
Recommendation was written) stated that these reasons ‘generally include reasons of 
an economic, technological, structural or similar nature’.
33
 It is from this report that 
                                               
27
 American courts have been restricting ‘at will’ powers by applying exceptions based on the 
principles of implied contract, good faith and civil liberty: ILO Digest, op cit at 9. 
28 American collective agreements often contain clauses that provide employees will not be 
discharged except for ‘just cause’ and establish grievance and arbitration procedures in alignment 
with South Africa’s: supra. 
29
 ‘A legal bar on downsizing for greater efficiency is not compatible with the dynamics of domestic 
and international labour market. Business has an operational requirement to be competitive. Business 
that anticipate prosper,’: citing Benjamin Paul, ‘Downsizing for Efficiency and Improved Profit’ in 
Thompson Clive and Benjamin Paul, South African Labour Law  vol 3 (updated since 1965) at 430. 
30
 On the migration of interest disputes to disputes of right: ‘When parties engage in economic 
bargaining, one of them should not lightly be allowed to pull the plug on the process by threatening 
the demise of the other if it does not get its way. The courts should look especially critically at the 
claim that a fair reason based on the operational requirements of a business permits an employer 
engaged in bargaining to throw the dismissal lever if its entire package is not accepted’: citing 
Thompson Clive, Bargaining over Business Imperatives: the music of the spheres after Fry’s Metals 
(2006) 27 ILJ 704. 
31
 Roskam, op cit (note 5). 
32
 Rubin, op cit (note 12)  491 at para 1. 
33 Idem, at para 2, citing ILC, 67th Session, 1981, Report VIII (1), at 23.  
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the vast majority of countries, including South Africa, take their lead. While South 
Africa’s definition may be in urgent need of clarification it is in alignment with that 
of many other countries.  
According to Neville Rubin in ‘Code of International Labour Law; Law, Practice 
& Jurisprudence’, Volume II Book  I (2005), the ILO’s Committee of Experts has 
pointed out that reasons ‘relating to’ the operation of the undertaking are generally 
defined by reference to redundancy or reduction of the number of posts for economic 
or technical reasons or due to force majeure or accident.  
Rubin cites rationalisation, modernisation, a fall in production, changed market or 
economic conditions requiring the dismissal of one or more workers and failure of 
the worker to adapt to work techniques
34
 as examples. Such dismissals can be 
individual or collective and may involve a reduction of the workforce or closure of 
the undertaking
35
 – providing a lot of flexibility for the employer, which South 
Africa adopts. 
In France, the courts have ruled that a termination of employment is not for an 
economic reason if the result of a reorganisation is not in the interests of the 
business.
36
 This test for substantive fairness is more onerous for employers than 
South Africa’s. Section 189A(19) of the LRA, see below, does not dispute the 
employers’ rationale provided that: 
The Labour Court must find that the employee was dismissed for a fair reason if – 
(a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer’s 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs; 
(b) the dismissal was operationally justifiable on rational grounds; 
(c) there was a proper consideration of alternatives; and 
(d) selection criteria were fair and objective. 
 
For enterprises with fewer than 50 employees, South African judgments differ
37
 
regarding the extent to which the courts have been willing to second-guess the 
employer’s rationale for retrenchment.
38
 As a general rule, once a court is satisfied 
                                               
34
 Citing Chile as an example of a country where failure to adapt to a work technique is valid grounds 
for dismissal; Rubin, op cit (note 12) at 492.  
35
 Idem at para 4. 
36 Idem at para 5. 
37
 Different definitions led to anomalous results in court: citing Roskam, op cit (note 5). 
38
 Five approaches taken by the courts ranging from Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA recognising the 
employers’ desire to increase profits as a legitimate operational requirement to the more 
interventionist stance of CWIU v Algorax as a measure of last resort: supra.  
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that the decision to retrench is based upon sound economic considerations it will not 
interfere with that decision.
39
 Roskam, however, observes the courts’ difficulty in 
determining a consistent test for substantive fairness where smaller enterprises have 
decided to retrench.  
Rubin is helpful here when he states that reasons relating to the operational 
requirements of the undertaking can also be defined in negative terms as those not 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker. 
In the final analysis, case law has played a key role in shaping the ILO concept and 
LRA definition of operational requirements. A comparative analysis of jurisprudence 
on the definition of the concept is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth 
noting a few key national cases that illustrate the immense flexibility for employers 
of South Africa’s definition of operational requirements.  
In Johnson v Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU,
40
 the Labour Appeal Court found that 
‘[operational requirements] do [not] always flow from the local needs of an 
employer’ but may also arise from the impact of global developments on the 
profitability of the parent company of a South African subsidiary.’ 
In NUMSA v Driveline Technologies (Pty) Ltd and another,
41
 the Labour Appeal 
Court held that the distinction between retrenchment (ie dismissal based on 
economic need) and redundancy (ie dismissal due to the disappearance of an 
employee’s job) both fall under the definition of operational requirements. An 
employer’s inability to pay a transport allowance was accepted as an economic need. 
Similarly, a merger has been found to be both an economic and a structural need, 




Nor are the effects of a protected strike excluded from the scope of the LRA’s 
definition of operational requirements. In SACWU & Others v Afrox Ltd, the Labour 
                                               
39
 It only becomes substantively unfair if it will not result in the business objective and dismissal is 
not supported on the facts; Benjamin, op cit (note 29) at 430.   
40
 [1998] 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC) at paras 1-2. 
41
 [2001] 2 BLLR 203 (LC). 
42
 SATU v The Press Corporation of SA Ltd [1998] 11 BLLR 1173 (LC) at 1180; LexisNexus, Labour 
Law Through The Cases at [LRA 9-20].  
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Appeal Court held that even operational requirements caused by a protected strike 
may justify such a dismissal.
43
  
By contrast, in CWIU & Others v Algorax (Pty)
 44
 the Labour Appeal Court 
suggested that operational requirements ‘may include the desire to reduce the cost in 
the absence of any necessity to do so’. In the example given by the court, employees 
may be fairly dismissed if they refuse to comply with an employer’s demand to work 
short-time as a cost-saving measure.
45
 
3. The obligation to consult    
The currency of mutual persuasion, formidable as it may seem to the uninitiated, is 
in alignment with that of other jurisdictions. Such consultation is ideally based upon 
tripartite participation through dialogue and self-regulation. It is part of a new 
generation of rights and culture of justification when the loss of livelihood is 
anticipated that emerged throughout the world in the 1990s.  
Considerable research and rigorous scrutiny of South African and international 
standards reveals that the eloquently phrased objectives of consultation in s189(2) of 
the LRA are not South Africa’s pearls of wisdom but those of the ILO. All national 
consultation measures – simplistically referred to as the ‘employers’ burden’ in 
leading text books – just codify ILO Convention 158 and ILO Recommendation 166. 
The obligation to consult is an international duty implemented in different ways 
across the globe. 
Most countries have statutes requiring consultation with employee representatives 
for collective dismissal.
46
 The ILO Termination of Employment Digest lists 45, 
including: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Canada, Caribbean Community, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, 
France, Gambia, Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, 
                                               
43
 ‘The employer’s right to fair labour practices in the form of a right to a fair dismissal based on 
operational requirements… must come into play when the exercise of the right to strike threatens the 
continued operation of the employer’s enterprise’ [1998] 2 BLLR 171 (LC), citing Labour Law 
Through the Cases: ibid.  
44
 [2003] 11 BLLR 337 (LC). 
45 ‘Operational requirements’ for purposes of s189 LRA refers to those of the current employer and 
does not include the operational requirements of a third party to whom the employer intends to 
transfer its business, Western Province Workers Association v Halgang Properties CC [2001] 6 
BLLR 693 (LC). 
46 See Annexure 4, ‘Statutory regulation of unfair dismissal’: ILO Digest op cit 384-387 at table 1.   
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Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand (with 
employees not employees’ representatives), Tunisia (commission for the supervision 
of dismissals), United Kingdom, United States of America ( if covered by WARN 
Act), Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe (with tripartite committee).  
Under such statutes, the ILO Digest states, the employer is ‘generally expected to 
consult workers’ representatives on the measures it intends to adopt’. Article 13 of 
ILO Convention 158 and Article 19 of ILO Recommendation 166 form the basis for 
much of this similar legislation (see words highlighted in bold).  
Division A. Consultation of Workers’ Representatives 
Article 13: 
(1) When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, 
technological, structural or similar nature, the employer shall: 
(a) provide the workers’ representatives concerned in good time with relevant 
information, including the reasons for termination contemplated, the number and 
categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the 
terminations are intended to be carried out; 
(b) give in accordance with national law and practice, the workers’ representative 
concerned, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be 
taken to avert or to minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the 
adverse effects of any termination on the workers concerned such as finding 
alternative employment. 
   
The statutory obligation for South African employers to consult employees when 
they are ‘contemplating’ dismissals is in s 189(1) of the Act, while s 189(2) of the 
LRA sets out the subject matter of consultation based on Article 13(b) of ILO 
Convention 158.
47
 Section 189A of the LRA, an amendment introduced in 2002, 
imposes additional obligations on employers with more than 50 employees in 
dismissals of more than 10 workers to consult under the auspices of the CCMA in 
the form of facilitation. Section 189A of LRA must now be read together with 
Facilitation Regulations (2003).  
The timing of consultation envisaged under Article 13(1) of the ILO Convention – 
when the employer ‘contemplates’
48
 retrenchment – is identical to s 189(1)(a) of the 
LRA (see below, words highlighted in bold), which states: 
When an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons 
based on the employer’s operational requirements, the employer must consult. 
                                               
47
 Grogan John, Dismissal Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices, 2ed (2007) 443. 
48
 Definition of ‘contemplates’: ‘to spend time considering a possible future action, or to consider one 
particular thing for a long time in a serious and quiet way’: Cambridge Dictionary Online. 
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The opportunity for workers to be consulted reflects a situation which differs from 
mere information. According to Rubin, consultation should have some influence on 
the decisions taken.
49
 To have a chance of making a positive contribution, Rubin 
points out, the Convention stipulates under Article 13(1)(b) that consultation must 
take place as ‘early as possible’, which allows the measures to be contemplated 
without haste and with circumspection. ILO Recommendation 166, Rubin observes, 
adds a further component to the ILO Convention. It proposes consultations before 
the stage where retrenchment becomes inevitable. 
While there is no definition of  ‘consultation’  in s 213 of the LRA, the purpose of 
it is spelt out in the preamble to s 189(2) of the LRA, which states that the consulting 
parties must engage in ‘a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process and attempt to 
reach consensus’.  
Here it should be emphasised that the ‘consensus-seeking process’ envisaged under  
s 189 and s 189A of the LRA requires the employer to do no more than consider 
suggestions from the employees or their representatives, and, if they are not seen as 
practical, give reasons for rejecting them. All the process does is to impose a culture 
of justification on employers for dismissal based on operational requirements.  
Consultation in this context differs from negotiation, which involves a willingness 
by the parties to compromise to reach agreement.
50
 The s 189(2) LRA interpretation 
of the concept is codified from jurisprudence under the previous 1956 Act.
51
 Then, 
the courts required consulting parties ‘to attempt to reach consensus’ – a process 
which went beyond the meaning of ‘consultation’ in the sense of ‘merely taking 
counsel’.  
                                               
49
 Rubin, op cit 536 at para 6. 
50
 ‘There is a distinct and substantial difference between consultation and bargaining. To consult 
means to take counsel or seek information or advice from someone and does not imply any kind of 
agreement, whereas to bargain means to haggle or wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement in terms 
of give and take. The term negotiate is akin to bargaining and means to confer with a view to 
compromise and agreement’: Metal & Allied Workers Union v Hart [1985] 6 ILJ 478 (IC). 
51 Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
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The courts regarded pre-retrenchment consultations as ‘an exhaustive joint 
problem-solving or consensus-seeking process between the employer and consulted 
parties’ involving the provision of all relevant information.
52
 
‘Consultation’ it has been held must therefore be ‘exhaustive’ and ‘not sporadic, 
superficial or a sham’ to be meaningful.
53
 The courts act as monitors of the process. 
Social dialogue is a two-way process. An employer cannot reasonably be expected to 
consult a trade union that evades dialogue or seeks to drag it out for no good reason. 
And a trade union cannot be blamed for failing to consult an employer if, from the 
outset, it was confronted with a fait accompli.
54
 The Code of Good Practice on 
Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements
55
 codifies this when it states: ‘The 
employer should in all good faith keep an open mind throughout and seriously 
consider proposals put forward.’
56
 
South Africa, it transpires, has not reinvented the wheel when it comes to 
mandatory consultation for dismissal based on operational requirements, just 
followed international labour standards and reshaped a couple of spokes. A unique 
part of the LRA is s 189(3)(a)-(j) with its inspired step-by-step approach to written 
notice and built-in rights to disclosure of information.
57
 However, even this part of 
the Act, widely perceived as unduly onerous by employers, is just a codification of 
ILO Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 – albeit an inspired one. The 
substantive detail of LRA s 189(3) adds nothing new to the ILO blueprint, although 
                                               
52
 The current s 189(1) echoes the words of Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd  v Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union [1999], op cit: Grogan, op cit (note 47) 444 at note 77.  
53
 Hadebe & Others v Romatex Industials Ltd [1986] 7 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
54 NUM & Others v Alexcor Ltd [2005] I BLLR 1186 (LC). 
55
 GG 2054 GN 1517 (16 July 1999). 
56
 Code of Good Practice was written before the 2002 amendment to s 189A of the Act and is 
therefore out of date in regard to this section: idem at para 3. The CCMA is currently updating its 
training manual on facilitation because ‘a lot has changed since the introduction of s 189A’: Senior 
Commissioner Leon Levy, CCMA, Western Cape.  
57
 LRA s 189 (3):The employer must issue a written notice inviting the other consulting parties to 
consult with it and disclose in writing all relevant information, including but not limited to – (a) the 
reason for the proposed dismissals; (b) the alternatives that the employer considered before proposing 
the dismissals, and the reasons for rejecting each of those alternatives; (c) the number of employees 
likely to be affected and the job categories in which they are employed; (d) the proposed method for 
selecting which employees to dismiss; (e) the time when, or the period during which, the dismissals 
are likely to take effect; (f) the severance pay proposed; (g) any assistance that the employer proposes 
to offer to the employees likely to be dismissed; (h) the possibility of future re-employment of the 
employees who are dismissed; (i) the number of employees employed by the employer, and (j) the 
number of employees that the employer has dismissed for reasons based on its operational 
requirements in the preceding 12 months.  
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it serves as a good summary and workable model of the new generation of rights that 
emerged in the 1990s.  
By contrast, s189A of the LRA, with its process-driven requirements for 
facilitation under the auspices of the CCMA, is far more innovative. The six-year-old 
section adds a new, home-grown version of the rights-based approach of the ILO 
Convention. It has, according to a senior CCMA Commissioner,
58
 saved thousands 
of jobs since its introduction in 2002 with its innovative solutions to finding 
alternative employment.  
Paradoxically, s 189A of the LRA despite its requirements for third-party 
intervention, is not as unpopular with employers as s 189(3) of the LRA. Facilitation 
is reportedly requested by at least 30 per cent of employers contemplating dismissal 
based on operational requirements and is regarded as a model of international best 
practice by the ILO.  
It should be emphasised that the facilitation provisions under LRA s189A are in 
alignment with international labour standards. Article 19 of ILO Recommendation 
166 at paragraph 2 states:  
Where appropriate, the competent authority should assist the parties in seeking 
solutions to the problems raised by the terminations contemplated. 
 
The ILO Recommendation gives a more active role to the competent authority than 
the ILO Convention in that it calls upon the authority to help the consulting parties 
find solutions to the problems raised by the proposed terminations, according to 
Rubin.  
Section 189A(3) of the LRA gives effect to Article 19 of the ILO Recommendation 
by allowing either party the option of a CCMA facilitator to chair the consultation 
process.
59
 Facilitation, as opposed to ad hoc consultation, follows a more formal 
workshop structure with up to four meetings between the parties unless a settlement 
can be reached sooner. Facilitation meetings
60
 are conducted on a ‘with prejudice’ 
                                               
58 Levy, op cit (note 56). 
59
 The consent of only one party is required for facilitation to take place under LRA s 189A, unlike at 
the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) in the United Kingdom where the 
agreement of both parties is necessary. 
60 Facilitation Regulations (2003). 
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basis and the process has been described as a ‘sea change’
61
 by CCMA 
Commissioners. The procedure is relatively popular with unions and employers, 
according to one CCMA facilitator in the Western Cape, who estimates that about 70 
per cent of requests for facilitation are brought at the instigation of unions and 30 per 
cent by employers.
62
    
Facilitation in South Africa is essentially a time-driven process with a statutory 60-
day moratorium on consultation. Swift provisions for disclosure under the LRA (s 16 
and s 189(3)-(4)) and Facilitation Regulations (s 5)
63
 ensure that deadlines are met. 
By contrast, in countries with no statutory obligation to consult employees, such as 
Cyprus, retrenchment procedures can be more protracted, regulated and complex for 
employers.
64
 In Israel, consultation provisions can be found in an array of collective 
agreements – as is the case in Japan, although the courts there also play a role. In 
New Zealand, where there is no statutory obligation to consult, the same consultation 
principles are considered the justification for dismissals in common law.
65
  
Research indicates that countries with no statutory or other provision for 
consultation in this area are less in alignment with international labour standards than 
those that have such provisions. The ILO Digest identifies countries without 
provisions as: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Chile, Hong Kong, Colombia, Dominican 
                                               
61 CCMA, s189 Facilitation Under the LRA; 2003 update for CCMA Commissioners (2003) at 2. 
62
 Levy, op cit (note 56). 
63
 Facilitation Regulations s 5: Power to order disclosure of information (1) If there is a dispute about 
the disclosure of information the facilitator may, after hearing representations from the parties, make 
an order directing an employer to produce documents that are relevant to the facilitation. 
64
 Cyprus: The Termination of Employment Law, 1967, as amended 1994 requires the employer to 
notify the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance of the proposed redundancies at least one month 
prior to the date they are implemented (s 21 TEL). The notification must include the number of 
employees likely to become redundant (and, where possible, their occupation, names and 
responsibilities), the branch which is affected and the reasons for the retrenchment. The TEL, 
however, does not require employers who are contemplating retrenchment to consult with and provide 
information to employee representatives. Provision for such information and consultation is made in 
Part II of the Industrial Relations Code (IRC) of 1977. The Code is not binding, so no legal sanctions 
can be imposed for not complying with its provisions. The IRC stipulates that the employer should 
notify the trade union at least two months before the date of retrenchment. After notification, 
consultations should be – as early as possible – carried out with the unions and employees in 
accordance with the provisions of the ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation 166: ILO 
Digest, op cit at 125. 
65
New Zealand: Where the employer contemplates termination for reasons of an economic, 
technological, structural or similar nature, he or she must discuss the proposed redundancy with the 
affected employees and any relevant union representative before the final decision is made. There 
must be true consultation which includes giving the employees and their representatives a real 
opportunity for making an input and considering any constructive suggestions they may submit. In 
addition, adequate information about the nature of the proposed ‘redundancy’ must be given to the 
employees before such consultation, citing idem at 27. 
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Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Panama, Singapore, Syria and Zambia.  
However, many of these countries, such as Mexico and Nepal, require notification 
and approval of the administrative authorities for retrenchment to be valid. Such 
statutory provisions are far more onerous for employers than South Africa’s 
mandatory obligation to consider alternatives. In addition, some of these countries, 
such as Mexico, pay far higher rates of severance pay than South Africa. 
4. The obligation to consult and small business  
While analysis shows that most countries have statutes requiring employers to 
consult employees’ representatives when they are contemplating retrenchment, the 
general application of such consultation procedures in South Africa under s 189 of 
the LRA is controversial in so far as it affects small businesses.
 
The same 
consultation procedure is applied to the retrenchment of a single domestic worker as 
a case involving the dismissal of 49 employees.  
 Section 189(1)(a) of the LRA gives full application to the ILO instrument where it 
stipulates: 
When an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons 
based on the employer’s operational requirements, the employer must consult. 
 
It should be stressed, that such general application of consultation practices under 
LRA s 189 to all ‘employees’ is in alignment with international labour standards. 
Article 13 of ILO Convention 158 sets no quantitative criteria for consultation 
procedures to apply.
66
 The obligation to consult can apply to a single worker, if 
national methods state, according to Rubin.  
However, the Committee of Experts, Rubin notes, observes that national legislation 
and collective agreements frequently exclude small and medium-sized enterprises 
from information and consultation procedures by introducing a minimum threshold 
to which these procedures apply, and that these excluded firms account for many, if 
not most, of the enterprises in some countries.  
Such an exclusion is in accordance with Article 13 of the ILO Convention at 
paragraph 2 where the instrument states: 
                                               
66 Rubin, idem at 535 para 1 citing General Survey, 1995 at para 277. 
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(2) The application of paragraph 1 of this Article may be limited by the methods of 
implementation referred to in Article 1
67
 of this Convention to cases in which the 
number of workers whose termination of employment is contemplated is at least a 
specified number or percentage of the workforce. 
 
The ILO mechanism of limitation – to a specified number or percentage of the 
workforce – is used in some advanced economies to simplify the consultation 
process and make it less onerous for small enterprises. Halton Cheadle is not out of 
alignment to have initiated a debate in South Africa over whether small business 
‘must consult’. It is quite legitimate, in terms of international standards, for unfair 
dismissal laws to exclude certain categories of employees from their application. In 
some countries, such as Italy, regulations for small businesses have been relaxed.
68
 
In South Africa, by contrast, the Labour Appeal Court has held that only one 
category of employees may not be retrenched – those on fixed-term contracts whose 
contracts have not yet expired.
69
  
Leading South African labour lawyer André van Niekerk,
70
 writing from a business 
perspective, contends that many other jurisdictions exclude categories of employees 
from dismissal laws because of the constraints such consultation procedures place on 
small businesses (such as hiring new staff) and argues that it is a valid area for 
review.
71
 He cites Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Switzerland and Turkey as examples of countries where employers with less than 20 
employees are exempt from statutory consultation and notification procedures.
72
 
For example, in Germany, the Protection against Unfair Dismissal Act 
73
 does not 
normally apply to enterprises employing less than 20 workers. In Australia, van 
Niekerk notes, recent amendments to labour legislation have the effect that 
businesses with up to 100 staff are exempt from unfair dismissal laws.
74
 The stated 
purpose of the Australian amendment is to generate economic growth and provide 
                                               
67
 ILO Convention 158: Part 1; Methods of Implementation, Scope and Definitions. Article 1. The 
provisions of this Convention shall, in so far as they are not otherwise made effective by means of 
collective agreements, arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other manners may be 
consistent with national practice, be given effect by laws or regulations.  
68
 Neither Italy nor Venezuela have ratified Convention 158; in ILO Digest, op cit 15 at note 59. 
69
 Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board [2004] 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC). 
70
 van Niekerk, op cit (note 4) at 9. 
71 Idem, at 3. 
72
 General Survey: ‘Protection against unjustified dismissal’, International Labour Conference 82
nd
 
Session 1995 at para 277: van Niekerk, op cit at 26. 
73
 s 17-18 Protection Against Dismissal Act (PADA), 1996; citing ILO Digest, op cit at 158.   
74 van Niekerk, idem at 15. 
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more job opportunities – although van Niekerk cites an OECD Report conducted in 
1996, which shows there were no comparative advantages to be had from the ‘denial 
or violation of core labour standards’.
75
 
In the UK, statutory consultation and notification procedures apply only in 
dismissals concerning 20 or more employees and extend over 90 days. In South 
Africa for s189A dismissals the consultation period may last up to 60 days – 
comparatively less onerous for employers.
76
 The most common waiting period, 
according to van Niekerk
77
 is 30 days (Norway, Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and 
Austria) but some countries extend consultation to 45 days (Italy and Poland), 75 
days (Portugal) and two to six months (Sweden). The length of consultation periods 
in other countries compare favourably (ie are in alignment) with the requirements of 
the LRA, even where s 189A of the Act and its 60-day moratorium applies. The 
length of consultation under the LRA is not unduly onerous for South Africa’s 
employers compared with that in many other countries.
78
 
Van Niekerk observes that managers can be excluded from unfair dismissal laws. 
At present the LRA draws no distinction between levels of seniority, and work 
security rights apply to all.  He argues that selective application of legislative 
standards, a mechanism identified by Cheadle
79
 in the Employment Equity Act,
80
 
may similarly be applied to unfair dismissals. For example, most managers are 
excluded from the hours of work provisions of the BCEA.
81
  
Selective application, according to van Niekerk, has ‘never been seriously 
contemplated’ in respect of South African rights to employment security, and a 
review is ‘appropriate’ and ‘necessary’. One of the reasons for such a ‘failure’, as 
                                               
75
 Citing Bob Hepple (2005) at 14-15: van Niekerek, op cit at 5. 
76
 UK: The definition of ‘redundancy’ is that the employee’s dismissal is attributable wholly or 
mainly to the fact that: – the employer has ceased or intends to cease to carry on that business in the 
place where the employee was so employed; or the requirements of that business for employees to 
carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the person affected was so employed have 
ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, citing s 139(1) Employment Rights Act, 
1996: ILO Digest, op cit at 347. 
77




 Cheadle, op cit (note 3). 
80 Act 55 of 1998, Ch 1(1)(b): ‘designated employer’ excludes employers employing fewer than 50 
employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a 
small business in terms of Schedule 4 to this Act. 
81
 Rationale for exclusion of managers is that their bargaining power is usually greater. They are 
capable of negotiating their rights: van Niekerk, idem at 12. 
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van Niekerk puts it, ‘is probably historical’.
82
 In other words, the exclusion of 
African workers from the legal framework governing employment rights for more 
than half a century means that the tripartite alliance (employers, unions and 
government) will not contemplate a dualist or non-coherent dismissal system.  
It is in this context that the employers’ obligation to consult all workers when 
retrenchment is contemplated should be seen in South Africa. While a full discussion 
of the country’s once racially exclusive labour laws is beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is worth mentioning a few important historical facts that van Niekerk omits.  
First, the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, the first so-called 
‘comprehensive’ labour law in South Africa, excluded African workers from the 
definition of ‘employee’, and therefore from membership of registered trade unions, 
from direct representation on industrial councils and from conciliation boards.
83
 The 
exclusion meant that they could be employed on inferior terms to those set by 
industrial councils or conciliation board agreements. Labour relations in South 
Africa were subject to this political and ideological ‘vision’ for more than 50 years. 
Second, the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 further revised South African 
labour legislation to bring it into line with apartheid. African workers were 
unofficially defined by the Prime Minister as ‘drawers of water and hewers of 
wood’.
84
 The Act entrenched racial division by prohibiting the registration of new 
‘mixed’ unions and formally introduced ‘job reservation’ for white workers. This 
dual system continued throughout the 1970s until industrial unrest by excluded 
African trade unions made the status quo unworkable.  
Finally, it was only in 1979 with the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry into Labour 
Legislation that African workers were allowed to join trade unions and be directly 
represented on industrial councils or conciliation boards, ending the dual system of 
labour relations. In this way, the 1980s saw the emergence of a coherent system of 
labour law in South Africa. Because African workers were disenfranchised, their 
                                               
82
 van Niekerk, ibid. 
83
 The definition of ‘employee’ in s 24 of the 1924 Act: du Toit Darcy et al, Labour Relations Law, A 
Comprehensive Guide, 5 ed (2006) at 7.   
84 Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, architect of apartheid. 
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unions were drawn into broader political struggles until the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act 83 of 1988 was promulgated and tripartism began in earnest.
85
  
The present Constitution entrenches rights to equality, labour rights, access to the 
courts and administrative justice for everyone. Any ‘selective application’ of 
employment security (as outlined in s 23 of the Constitution) could not be considered 
constitutionally ‘justifiable’, even though the legislative mechanism is accepted by 
the ILO and implemented in other democracies.  A limitation on the Constitutional 
right to fair labour practices in South Africa cannot be justifiable if social justice is 
both the goal and the precondition of the Constitution, as van Niekerk states.
86
   
A review of selective application of employment security is neither ‘appropriate’ 
nor ‘necessary’, as van Niekerk would have us believe. His argument is a response to 
Halton Cheadle’s unpublished paper ‘Regulated Flexibility and Small Business: 
Revisiting the LRA & BCEA’ (2006) but goes further in its recommendations for 
exclusion than Cheadle’s.   
Cheadle, like van Niekerk, contends that the consultation procedures for dismissal 
based on operational requirements are ‘not suitable’ for small businesses: 
They do not typically have the internal resources nor can they afford the external 
resources to advise them to follow the complex set of obligations and consultations 
before dismissal for operational requirements. It may be less onerous but without 
any loss of protection to exclude small business from the detailed retrenchment 
provisions in the LRA and to supplement the general duty in section to follow a 
fair procedure under section 188 with provisions in a code setting out a simplified 





While there may be something to be said for a simplified consultation procedure 
for enterprises with fewer than five or six people in economic crisis, it is worth 
reiterating Rubin’s point that small and medium-sized firms account for many, if not 
most, enterprises in the labour market.
88
 Cheadle’s concept paper lacks substantive 
detail on which statutory elements should be changed.  
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 du Toit, op cit at 13. 
86
 van Niekerk, op cit at 6. 
87 Cheadle, op cit 29 at para 88. 
88
 For example in the UK only 10 per cent of the total number of legal proceedings initiated for 
termination of employment in 1994 were considered unjustified and 53 per cent of these cases took 
place in enterprises employing fewer than 50 workers; ‘Great Britain Labour Force Survey’ (1994) 
cited in ILO Digest, op cit at 12. 
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One can only surmise from Cheadle’s choice of words ‘complex set of obligations 
and consultations’ that he is referring to s 189 (3) (a)-(j) – the employer’s obligation 
to issue a written notice to consult, because he does not cite any particular subsection 
as too onerous.  
In addition, it is worth bearing in mind that Codes do not afford the same level of 
protection as statutes, and a Code setting out the simplified procedure, albeit a 
rigorous one, would not afford equal protection to employees as the existing statute. 
To quote Cheadle:  
Codes do not impose duties but set standards of behaviour. Deviation from those 
standards do not give rise to any penalty but may lead to an adverse finding in the 
CCMA or the Labour Court unless the deviation can be justified. The primary 




Codes also run the risk of being overtaken by jurisprudence if they are not 
regularly updated. Also, they inevitably lead to a loss of protection if they are the 
main mechanism of protection. For example, the present Code of Practice on 
Dismissal on Operational Requirements was written in 1999, before s 189A of the 
LRA was introduced, and has not been updated subsequently. It has been described 
by Roskam as saying ‘nothing more than what is stated in s 189’
90
 and ‘not useful’.
91
 
While Roskam, in his concept paper, also states that a new Code should ‘include a 
section on the applicable procedure required of small business employers’ he too 
gives no substantive detail on the simplified redraft that he proposes. It is unclear 
how Cheadle, the co-architect of ‘regulated flexibility’ in South Africa, sees such a 
‘voluntary mechanism’ not leading to a loss of protection for excluded workers. How 
will a ‘regulated flexibility lite’ for small businesses that merely ‘sets standards’ give 
effect to constitutional principles of social justice?   
It should also be emphasised that the legislative flexibility Cheadle, van Niekerk 
and Roskam envisage for small businesses is generally found in the more developed 
parts of Western Europe and is underpinned by generous social security measures – 
provisions that are virtually non-existent in South Africa. 
                                               
89
Cheadle, idem 7 at para 20c. 
90
 Roskam, op cit 21 at para 5.3.  
91 Idem 2 at 2.2. 
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For example, in the UK a retrenched worker could expect to receive inter alia 
income support, housing benefit, child benefit and family tax credit.
92
 Austria, 
France and the Netherlands have social plans.
93
 In some countries, for example 
Denmark, there is a trade-off between low statutory protection against dismissal and 
high levels of income protection for those who lose their jobs.  
South Africa, by contrast, has comparatively low income protection, particularly in 
terms of statutory severance pay (see section – page 33). Consultation, rigorously 
applied under s 189 and s 189A of the LRA, is the South African employee’s prime 
source of protection against unfair dismissal.  
Every employee has a constitutional right to fair labour practices in South Africa. 
Any limitation on this fundamental right will inevitably lead to excluded sections of 
the labour force experiencing inferior labour rights and work conditions.  The 
‘selective application’ of employment security rights is not a viable model for South 
Africa given the country’s racist legacy. It would re-expose the historical fault-lines 
of dual labour practice and lead to worst international practice.  
5. Measures to avoid or minimise dismissal  
International labour standards, according to Neville Rubin, reflect the principle that 
the employer should only use termination of employment as a last resort
94
 and that 
he or she should first consider all possible measures that would avoid dismissals.  
However, South African labour law is less onerous for employers than Articles 21 
and 22 of ILO Recommendation 166 because the LRA does not state that dismissal 
based on operational requirements may only be used as a last resort, notes Darcy du 
Toit.
95
 It should be emphasised that s 189(2)(a) of the LRA stipulates measures to 
avoid or minimise dismissals only as a topic that must be considered in consultation.  
The employer is obliged to have considered ‘alternatives before proposing the 
dismissals and be able to give the reasons for rejecting each of those alternatives’ 
under s 189(3)(b) of the Act in his or her written notice to the consulting party. The 
                                               
92
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 ILO Digest, op cit 400-402 at table 4 (See Annexure 5). 
94
 Rubin, op cit 545 at para 2.  
95
 du Toit, Business Restructuring and Operational Requirements Dismissals: Algorax and Beyond  
(2005) 26 ILJ 595. 
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employees’ representatives are then free to suggest other alternatives in consultation. 
These alternative possibilities must also be explored by the employer. 
Although, Rubin observes, ILO Convention 158 does not indicate the substantive 
content of such possibilities – except for an explicit reference to ‘finding alternative 
employment’
96
 either within the establishment or elsewhere – this is one of the key 
measures that employers can take to avoid dismissals.  
In addition, it should be stressed that ILO Recommendation 166 goes further than 
South African legislation when it says that an employer’s decision to dismiss will 
only be considered ‘fair’ or ‘valid’ if  the employer has sought to ‘avert or minimise’ 
dismissals and that the measures in Article 21 of the ILO Recommendation are 
among those that should be considered.  
Such measures outlined in Article 21 include inter alia restriction of hiring, 
spreading the workforce, reduction of staff levels over a certain period of time to 
permit natural reduction of the workforce, internal transfers, training and retaining, 
voluntary early retirement with appropriate income protection, restriction of 
overtime and reduction of normal hours of work. 
According to Rubin, when Article 21 of the ILO Recommendation was drafted in 
the early 1980s, the measures to avoid dismissal were proposed in a climate of 




CCMA facilitators in South Africa have observed nearly 20 years later that there is 
a major difference between retrenchments which originate from an employer’s need 
to expand (aspirational changes) and those that stem from a firm’s poor financial 
performance, loss of markets and an inability to beat competition (distress changes). 
Aspirational changes are proposed in an atmosphere of confidence in the future and 
optimism for growth. The employer anticipates improved career prospects for its 
employees and may consider increased training, improved severance or retirement 
pay. In distress situations, by contrast, an employer is not necessarily able to offer 
more than the statutory minimum.
98
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 Rubin, ibid at para 3. 
97
 ILO Digest op cit at 29-31. 
98 CCMA, op cit (note 61) at 6-7. 
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The alternatives considered, therefore, depend on the facts of each case and the 
economic rationale for the employer’s proposed changes. For example, in an 
aspirational situation, information from an employer that there are a large number of 
employees
99
 may suggest to a facilitator or union that there are opportunities for 
voluntary retirement or retrenchment instead of compulsory retrenchment.  
In distress situations, by contrast, employees may be willing to take unpaid leave 
or accept short-time. For example, since 1993 a series of innovative employment 
agreements based on the reduction of work hours have been developed in Germany. 
These agreements, negotiated in the motor industry at Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz 
and General Motors, ensured that the enterprises would not carry out retrenchment 
for a set period in exchange for a reduction of work time and wages, provided a 
monthly income was assured.
100
  
Paying partial compensation for temporarily reduced hours is popular with 
employers, according to Rubin, because it saves them the cost of severance pay as 
well as the cost of recruiting and training a new workforce. 
In the same way, internal transfers are relatively cost-free. In South Africa, s 
189(3)(j) of the Act and question 5 of LRA Form 7.20 (in s 189A cases) ask 
employers how many employees have been dismissed for operational requirements 
in the past 12 months. This assists the facilitator (or union) to assess the scope for 
transfers to alternative jobs within the operation.
101
 However, if no suitable 
vacancies exist, the possibility of ‘bumping’ – ie placing longer serving employees 
in positions held by shorter serving employees and retrenching the latter – must be 
considered in South Africa. 
In Amalgamated Workers’ Union of SA v Fedics Food Services,
102
 it was held that:  
There was an obligation on the employer to consider whether it should do so 
[bump] because if [it] was able to do so in a fair manner which was not injurious to 
itself and other employees, then it should have given serious consideration to doing 
so, to avoid the consequences of retrenchment. 
 
                                               
99 Under LRA s 189A, first question on form LRA 7.20: How many employees does the employer 
employ?; s 189(3)(i): the number of employees employed by the employer. 
100
 Digest, op cit at 29-31. 
101
 CCMA, op cit at 5. 
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Similarly in Porter Motor Group v Karachi, the LAC held that s 189(2) of the 
LRA:  
requires both parties to attempt to reach consensus on alternative measures to 
retrenchment, so there is a duty on an employee as well to raise bumping as an 




With the exception of bumping,
104
 South African courts have differed in their 
approaches to the appropriate level of scrutiny to ‘finding alternatives’ in s 189 
dismissals. While ILO Recommendation 166 does not have the force of international 
law, du Toit notes, it has been persuasive when seeking to interpret the LRA and its 
guidelines have entered South African case law.  
For example, in SA Chemical Workers Union and other v Afrox,
105
 the LAC held 
that ‘an employer must seek appropriate measures to avoid dismissals, minimize 
their number, change their timing and mitigate their adverse effects’ – a reference to 
Article 13(1)(b) of the ILO Convention. The court said:  
These are all indications that dismissal should at least not be the first resort, even 
though the LRA does not expressly state that dismissal should only be used as a 
last resort when dismissing for operational reasons.  
 
Five years later, in CWIU v Algorax
106
, the court drew a different conclusion:  
[s 189 implies] that the employer has an obligation, if at all possible to avoid 
dismissals of employees for operational requirements altogether or to minimise the 
number of dismissals if possible and to consider other alternatives of addressing its 
problems without dismissing the employees and to disclose in writing what those 
alternatives are that it considered and to give reasons for rejecting each of those 
alternatives. 
 
In short, ‘business efficiency rather than necessity is the [international] yardstick,’ 




 of ILO Recommendation 166 stipulates that no 
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 [1999] 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
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 du Toit, op cit (note 95).  
108 ILO Recommendation 166, at Article 19: All parties concerned should seek to avert or minimise as 
far as possible termination of employment for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or 
similar nature, without prejudice to the efficient operation of the undertaking, establishment or service, 
and to mitigate the adverse effects of any termination of employment for these reasons on the worker 
or workers concerned… 
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measure to avoid or minimise dismissal can be prejudicial to the ‘efficient operation’ 
of the business.  
Consequently, the period over which the consultation process extends can be 
relatively more onerous for employers if there are urgent or entrepreneurial factors 
giving rise to the terminations contemplated.
109
  A dispute about the fairness of such 
a dismissal cannot be referred to a bargaining council or the CCMA until 30 days 
after the date of the dismissal, or within 30 days of the employer making a final 
decision to dismiss under s191 (b) of the LRA. As noted above, facilitation under 
s189A of the LRA is essentially time-driven with 60 days between a notice of 
intention and issuing of an award or ruling – although if the parties reach agreement 
sooner the matter can be resolved. 
As already discussed (see p18), comparative research shows that consultation 
periods are no lengthier in South Africa than they are in many other jurisdictions, 
even where s 189A of the LRA and its 60-day moratorium applies.   
Although South African employees can use consultation to change the timing of 
dismissals under s 189(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA,
110
 the courts are not sympathetic to 
‘wilful foot-dragging’ by unions, according to Grogan.
111
 Conversely, if more time is 
needed for consultation, the employer is wise to grant it.
112
 Consultation is seldom 
deemed sufficient when it is rushed. To be ‘meaningful’, in terms of s 189(2) of the 
LRA, the consultation process must allow sufficient time for disclosure, 
consideration and dialogue.   
In closing, both parties should aim to get the best deal they can through a process 
of mutual persuasion. Unions need to be proactive and suggest innovative 
alternatives that assist the employer and facilitator to avoid and/or minimise the 
number of retrenchments. Thousands of jobs have reportedly
113
 been saved in this 
way under s 189A of the LRA since the amendment’s introduction in 2002.  
                                               
109 The period of consultation under s 189 of the LRA is not defined but according to the Code of 
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111 Grogan, op cit, at 462. 
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113 Levy, op cit (note 58).  
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6. Measures to mitigate the adverse effects of dismissal  
The LRA places a statutory duty on consulting parties to consider ways they can 
‘mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals’ under s 189(2)(a)(iv) of the Act. This 
measure is given substantive content where the employer must in written notice 
consider at s 189(3) of the Act:  
(e) the time, when or the period during which, the dismissals are likely to take 
effect …  
(g) any assistance that the employer proposes to offer to the employees likely to be 
dismissed and;  
(h) the possibility of the future re-employment of the employees who are dismissed. 
 
The LRA uses the words and concepts of ILO Recommendation 166, Articles 25-
26 as a blueprint: 
Mitigating the Effects of Termination  
25. (1) In the event of termination of employment for reasons of an economic, 
technological, structural or similar nature, the placement of the workers affected in 
suitable alternative employment as soon as possible with training or retraining, 
where appropriate, should be promoted by measures suitable to national 
circumstances, to be taken by the competent authority, where possible with the 
collaboration of the employer and the workers’ representatives concerned. 
 
According to Rubin, the main responsibility for helping workers in retrenchment 
situations falls upon the competent authority, in collaboration with the employer and 
workers’ representatives where possible.
114
 The aim, according to Rubin, is to 
introduce a degree of tripartite participation into the search for ways of mitigating 
the effects of dismissal. The intention of the ILO text is not to impinge on the 
employer. ‘Where possible’ is the language used by Article 25(1) of the 
Recommendation.  
In South Africa such tripartite participation is given best effect under s 189A of the 
LRA with the appointment of a facilitator under the auspices of the CMMA. In 
alignment with ILO Recommendation 166, the LRA introduces tripartism without 
impinging on the employer’s ultimate decision. All the employer must do is to 
consider the possibility of mitigating the adverse effects. While consultation may 
initially seem onerous to employers, experience shows that ‘meaningful joint 
consensus’ can often be reached through the innovative suggestion of alternatives to 
                                               
114 Rubin, op cit 548 at para 2. 
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dismissal that may benefit both the enterprise’s long-term labour relations and its 
future prosperity.  
According to Rubin the effective application of the ILO Article also depends on 
training.
115
 More generous financial provisions for training are also contained in 
Article 26 (1) of the ILO Recommendation,
116
 although in South Africa an employer 
is not obliged to offer retrenched employers special training to enable them to 
become capable of fulfilling the tasks of new vacancies, according to Grogan.
117
 By 
contrast, in New Zealand, under common law the employer is required to consider 
alternative options, including training.
118
  
Furthermore, in South Africa, adds Grogan, employers are not obliged to seek 
alternative work for retrenched employees with other employers. However, it is 
possible that a court may hold that fairness requires a company in a group to seek 
posts among corporate affiliates.
119
 Article 25(2) of the ILO Recommendation says:  
Where possible, the employer should assist the workers affected in the search for 
suitable employment, for example, through direct contacts with other employers. 
 
Nor does the LRA expressly impose an obligation on employers to rehire 
retrenched workers, although the employee parties are entitled to be consulted on the 
possibility of it under s 189(3)(h) of the LRA.
120
 The obligation to consider a 
possibility is far less onerous upon employers than an obligation to make an offer of 
alternative employment. 
This lack of an obligation on employers to rehire retrenched workers in South 
Africa contrasts with China, where in collective dismissals, re-employment priority 
must be given to retrenched employees for up to six months after the redundancy.
121
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121 China: s 27 Labour Law (1995) cited in ILO Digest, op cit at 109. 
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The requirement is even more onerous for employers in Cyprus, where priority must 





 wage earners whose employment is terminated for economic reasons 
are given priority re-engagement
124
 if the firm wants to re-engage wage earners with 
the same professional skills. This right can be exercised for one year. The order of  
re-engagement is determined according to the employee’s length of service in the 
firm. The protection is even more onerous for employers in the Republic of Korea, 
where retrenched employees have priority of re-employment for two years, if the 
employer recruits similar workers.
125
 
The LRA, by contrast, does not state how long a South African employer should 
keep open such an offer or the criteria according to which they should be selected for  
re-employment. However, a refusal by an employer to re-employ an employee is a 
‘dismissal’ under s 186(1)(d) of the Act if an ‘employer who dismissed a number of 
employees for the same or similar reasons has offered to re-employ one or more of 
them but has refused to re-employ another’. 
This means that in South Africa retrenched employees may challenge non  
re-employment as an ‘unfair dismissal’. However, employers retain the right to 
choose whether retrenched employees are suitable for vacancies that may arise.
126
 
If an employer has agreed to re-employ retrenched employees, he or she is obliged 
to do so. Grogan suggests that in the absence of an agreed period, the concept of 
‘reasonableness’ should be applied.
127
 In practice, re-employment is an important 
means of mitigating the adverse effects of dismissal and, according to a senior 
CCMA Commissioner, has saved many jobs.  
Guidelines for rehiring can be found in ILO Recommendation 166 at Article 24. 
However, they are very flexible.  
Priority of Rehiring 
24 (1) Workers whose employment has been terminated for reasons of an 
                                               
122
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economic, technological, structural or similar nature, should be given a certain 
priority of rehiring if the employer again hires workers with comparable 
qualifications, subject to their having, within a given period from the time of their 
leaving, expressed a desire to be rehired. 
(1) Such priority of rehiring may be limited to a specified period of time. 
(2) The criteria for the priority of rehiring, the question of retention of rights – 
particularly seniority rights – in the event of rehiring, as well as the terms 
governing the wages of rehired workers, should be determined according to the 
methods of implementation referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Recommendation. 
 
The ILO guidelines are based on the idea that where an employer has to later hire 
staff again, out of fairness, a certain priority should be granted to the workers whose 
employment was terminated.
128
 Rubin notes that the legislation of many countries 
establishes the principle of priority of rehiring as a duty, while in other countries it is 
included in collective agreements or other methods of implementation.
129
 However, 
it is generally specified that priority goes to workers with comparable qualifications. 
It should be emphasised that the LRA does not prescribe such measures but 
imposes a duty to consult about the possibility of rehiring under s 189(3)(h) and is 
far less onerous on employers than legislation in many other jurisdictions. There is a 
big difference between ‘should be given a certain priority’ for re-employment and 
‘the possibility of’ being considered for future re-employment. While the LRA 
affords less protection to employees than the international labour standard, there is a 
duty on employers not to rehire unfairly under s 186(d) of the LRA. 
7. Selection criteria  
Employers in South Africa are generally given a free hand when it comes to 
selecting employees for retrenchment, and the courts intervene only to ensure that 
such dismissal has not been used been as an opportunity to discard employees for 
reasons unrelated to operational requirements.
130
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that choosing employees for retrenchment is 
the most onerous stage of consultation for employee parties. Inevitably, employees 
and union representatives are forced to name colleagues and draw up a hit-list.  
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 Rubin, op cit 547 at para 1. 
129 Ibid at para 3. 
130
 Code of Good Practice on Dismissal Based on Operational Requirements states that selection 
criteria that infringe a fundamental right protected by the Act can never be fair. It includes length of 
service, skills and qualifications. Generally, it states the test for fair and objective criteria will be 
satisfied by the LIFO principle. 
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The consulting parties are obliged to try and agree a method for selecting 
employees for retrenchment under s 189(2)(b) of the LRA. If no selection criteria are 
agreed, the criteria must be ‘fair’ and ‘objective’ under s 189(7)(b) of the LRA. 
The principle of ‘last in first out’ (LIFO) commends itself to this purpose of 
objectivity, according to the Code of Good Practice on Dismissal Based on 
Operational Requirements,
131
  but other criteria – such as qualifications, attendance 
record and productivity – which can also be objectively verified and applied equally, 
have been accepted as ‘fair’. Essentially, the method should be agreed between the 
parties where possible.  
If criteria are established in advance, as advocated by the ILO, the risk of 
subjective decision is reduced. ILO Recommendation 166, Article 23(1) seeks to 
make the choice of workers affected by dismissal as objectively as possible and 
avoid the risk of arbitrary decision.  
Criteria for Selection for Termination 
23 (1) The selection by the employer of workers whose employment is to be 
terminated for reasons of an economic, technological structural or similar nature 
should be made according to criteria, established wherever possible in advance, 
which give due weight both to the interests of the undertaking, establishment or 




Research shows that the criteria most often applied to selection for termination are 
occupational skills, length of service and family circumstances. Other criteria may 
sometimes be included, such as the difficulty of finding alternative employment. 
In some countries the focus of selection criteria is on protecting the most 
vulnerable workers. This is accepted practice in Belarus, Benin, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, 
France, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Portugal, Senegal and Tunisia.
133
  
In other countries, legislation protects certain categories of employee, such as the 
disabled, from selection for retrenchment. Employers can also be encouraged to 
retain employees with greater numbers of dependants. This is the case in Ethiopia, 
Mexico, and Bulgaria. While in other jurisdictions, employee representatives or trade 
union officials enjoy priority for retention, or are absolutely protected. 
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 (1999) GN 1517 GG 20254. 
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133 Rubin, op cit 546 at para 6. 
 34 
In Bulgaria, family and material situation or health conditions of the employee 
should be taken into consideration. In cases where there are two employees with 
equal qualifications, the one with the more disadvantaged situation should not be 
dismissed. Similarly, where there are workers with equal qualifications, those with 
spouses on unemployment benefit or who are the sole breadwinners should be given 





 preference against retrenchment is given to employees who have 
been disabled by a work-related injury, shop stewards and expectant mothers.
136
 
Similarly, in France, criteria must take into account family responsibilities, 
particularly in the case of single parents, length of service, situation of employees 
whose re-entry into the labour market is difficult (disabled persons or elderly 
employees), as well as skills.
137
 Likewise, in Senegal, selection criteria take social 
factors and seniority into account in cases of workers with equal aptitude.
138
  
In South Africa, employers are given far greater flexibility over selection criteria 
than in the countries mentioned above. Perhaps more consideration should be given 
to the most vulnerable workers where possible. For example, if there are two 
employees with equal aptitude, family responsibilities should be taken into 
consideration so that single parents, sole breadwinners, employees with the most 
dependants, should be retained where possible.  
Likewise, efforts should be made where possible to retain disabled employees, 
expectant mothers and elderly workers – employees least likely to find alternative 
employment. Such measures would be in accordance with the purpose of the LRA’s  
s 1 to advance social justice and give best effect to ILO Recommendation 166  
Article 23 – ‘to give due weight to both the interests of the undertaking, 
establishment or service and to the interests of workers’. 
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Selection criteria for bumping
139
 have largely been determined by national case 
law. Jurisprudence has established that specialised skills possessed by employees of 
shorter service may justify a departure from this local practice,
140
 as does disruption 
to the business or placing an unreasonable burden on the employer.
141
 Horizontal 
bumping should take place before vertical bumping.
142
 This makes the process less 
onerous for employees, but requires employers to draw up a pool of possible 
candidates, including inter-departmental positions, and consider retraining. But it 
remains the employer’s prerogative to choose staff for managerial posts, says Grogan.  
8. Severance pay 
Severance pay is viewed as among the most onerous of social costs, particularly by 
employers who due to economic difficulties are forced to reduce their staff. The need 
to make severance payments can further jeopardise the firm’s economic position.
143
 
However, there seems to be general agreement on the need to guarantee a minimum 
income to a worker while he or she looks for a new job.  
In South Africa, an employee who is dismissed for reasons based on the 
employer’s operational requirements is entitled to one week’s remuneration for each 
completed year of continuous service, the minimum severance pay under s 41(2) of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
144
 (BCEA). Although the amount is in 
alignment with Article 12 of ILO Convention 158,
145
 which states that the sum must 
be calculated inter alia, on length of service and the level of wages, South Africa’s 
rate of statutory severance pay is comparatively low (see Figure 1 overleaf).   
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Figure 1 
Twenty nine jurisdictions listed in the ILO Termination of Employment Digest 
award higher statutory severance payments than South Africa.
146
 In approximate 
order, from most generous to least, with South Africa at the bottom: 
Country   Statutory severance pay 
Mexico   six months’ wages for first year of service, 20 days for 
     each extra year 
Brazil   two months’ for each year of service 
Italy    one year’s wages divided by 15.5 plus 1.5% for each 
     year’s service plus compensation for inflation 
Chile    one month’s wages for each year of service 
China    one month’s wages for each year of service 
Colombia   one month’s wages for each year of service 
Iran                   one month’s wages for each year of service 
Philippines        one month’s wages for each year of service 
Bangladesh   30 days’ wages for each year of service 
Korea   30 days’ wages for each year of service 
Nepal   30 days’ wages for each year of service  
Ethiopia   30 days’ wages for first year of service, 40 days’ 
     wages for subsequent years, with a maximum of 12 
     months’ wages 
Dominican Republic maximum of 23 days’ wages for each year of service 
Pakistan   20 days wages for each year of service 
Cyprus   minimum two weeks to maximum four weeks’ wages 
     for each year of service 
Egypt                          half a month’s pay for first five years of service, one 
     month for each subsequent year 
Syria           half a month’s pay for each of the first five years of 
     service, one month’s pay for each subsequent year 
Caribbean Community two weeks’ wages for first 10 years of service, three 
     weeks wages for each subsequent year  
India               15 days’ wages for each year of service 
Kenya   15 days’ pay for each year of service 
Mauritius   15 days’ wages for each year of service 
Jamaica   two weeks’ for each year for first 10 years, three 
     weeks for each year of service thereafter 
Vietnam   half a month’s salary for each year of service 
Argentina   two weeks’ for each year of service 
Lesotho   two weeks’ for each year of service 
Zambia   two weeks’ for each year of service 
Cameroon   40% of monthly wage 
Côte d’Ivoire     40% of monthly wage 
Malaysia    10 days’ wages for first year of service, 15 days’ for 
     each of the next four years of service 
South Africa               one week’s pay for each year of service 
                                               
146See Annexure 5 on rates of severance pay: cited in ILO Digest, op cit (note 46) 399-402 at Table 4. 
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Nine of the countries are in Africa: 
Country   Statutory severance pay  
Ethiopia   30 days’ wages for first year of service, 40 days’ 
     wages for subsequent years, with a maximum of 12 
     months wages  
Egypt                           half a month’s wages for first five years of service, 
     one month for each subsequent year 
Kenya   15 days’ wages for each year of service 
Mauritius   15 days’ wages for each year of service 
Lesotho              two weeks’ wages for each year of service 
Zambia   two weeks’ wages for each year of service 
Cameroon    40% of monthly wage 
Côte d’Ivoire     40% of monthly wage 
South Africa                 one week’s wages for each year of service 
 
Nine of the countries pay approximately one month’s wages for each year of 
service – Bangladesh, Chile, China, Colombia, Iran, Italy, Korea, Nepal and the 
Philippines. The highest severance pay is in Mexico – six months’ pay for the first 
year of service and 20 days’ for each year of service, followed by Brazil at two 
months’ pay for each year of subsequent service. 
Three of the countries pay 15 days’ per year of service – India, Mauritius, Kenya 
and Lesotho. The other countries, besides South Africa, paying one week for each 
year of service are the United Kingdom and Namibia. However, the UK has greater 
social security provision, in terms of old age and invalidity benefits in alignment 
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In South Africa, severance pay is only paid for dismissal based on operational 
requirements, a limitation often regarded as deeply unfair by those dismissed for 
reasons related to capacity or conduct with years of seniority.
148
 In some countries, 
the legislation makes severance pay an absolute right based on length of service. The 
right is acquired irrespective of the reason for termination of employment. Some 
countries regard severance pay as a right acquired by the worker that must always be 
paid, even in the case of voluntary resignation or serious misconduct, such as in 
Venezuela. This allowance is regarded in some countries as a type of mandatory 
savings scheme which is increased with years of service regardless of the reason for 
dismissal. This is far more onerous and burdensome for employers than provisions 
under the LRA. Severance pay plays an important role in income protection in many 




South Africa is in alignment with many African countries with a French labour 
relations background, where inter-occupational agreements set a minimum level of 
compensation but make provision for collective agreements to modify fixed statutory 
amounts.
150
 This contrasts with some jurisdictions where the amount is fixed, such as 
in the Czech Republic, although severance pay is usually still calculated according to 
level of wages and length of service. 
Nonetheless, the maximum amount payable is sometimes restricted. For example, 
in Spain the limit is 12 months’ wages and there may also be a specified minimum. 
In South Africa there is no ceiling. All employees, irrespective of their status, are 
entitled to severance pay if they are dismissed for reasons based on operational 
requirements. 
The BCEA does not empower the Minister of Labour to exempt employers from 
the obligation to provide severance pay. A dispute about entitlement to the provision 
may be referred to a bargaining council or the CCMA but a CCMA Commissioner is 
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 Severance pay as an obligation generally rests on the employer, whereas social security schemes 
are usually financed by public sources.  
150 Digest, op cit at 19. 
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not empowered to arbitrate disputes concerning claims by employees to severance 
pay in excess of the statutory amount.
151
 
Severance pay is the last issue the parties are obliged to consult under s 189(2)(c) 
of the LRA, although the employer must propose severance pay in its written notice 
to the consulting parties under s 189(3)(f) of the Act.  
Where severance pay is agreed in excess of the statutory minimum, the employer is 
obliged to pay that amount.
152
 However, an employee who unreasonably
153
 refuses 
an offer of alternative employment with the retrenching employer or another 
employer is not entitled to severance pay under BCEA s 41(4).
154
  
However, in the final analysis, South Africa’s severance payments are low 
compared with those in some other countries and cannot be considered unduly 
onerous for employers, even by national standards. One week’s pay for each year of 
service is a minimal sum, especially in a country with little other income protection. 
The BCEA does not reflect loyal years of service with sliding scales of pay, as 
Jamaican law does or protect against inflation, as Italian law does. An amendment to 
s 41 of the BCEA may encourage voluntary retirement or retrenchment of employees 
with longer years of service.
155
 
Nonetheless, the wide statutory definition of ‘employee’ in South Africa makes the 
application of severance pay relatively more widespread than in some other countries. 
The Digest table on severance pay shows qualifying periods vary widely. Some 
countries restrict severance pay to workers who have been employed for one year 
(South Africa, Benin, Mali, Peru and Venezuela), two years (Gabon), three years 
(Mexico), five years (Bolivia, in cases of voluntary retirement, and Malawi),  
                                               
151
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10 years (Panama, if the worker is over 40 years of age) or even 20 years 
(Switzerland, where the worker must be over 50 years of age.)
156
 
Generous application of severance pay in South Africa – low qualifying period and 
no ceilings – makes this otherwise limited statutory provision (only for retrenchment) 
relatively more onerous for employers, although it still cannot be considered a 
significant financial burden for most local employers.  
9. Notification of the administrative authorities 
Nineteen out of 68 countries listed in the ILO Digest table have a statutory duty to 
notify the administrative authorities of collective dismissals.
157
 However, such 
notification, also a provision of ILO Convention 158, is not a statutory 
requirement
158
 in South Africa except in the case of miners (see below).  
Jurisdictions with a general statutory requirement to notify the administrative 
authority, according to the Digest, include: Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt (for all dismissals), Guinea, India (when the establishment has more 
than 100 workers), Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico (by arbitration committee), Namibia, 
the Netherlands, Pakistan (authorisation from the Labour Court needed except in an 
extreme emergency to close down; also has the power to suspend collective 
dismissals) and Zimbabwe (with tripartite committee). 
Some of these countries not only require that the relevant authority be informed but 
they also require the authority’s approval for a termination to be considered justified. 
For example, in Sri Lanka, any dismissal without the approval of the Labour 
Commissioner is null and void.
159
 In addition, there is no machinery for appeal, as 
the decision is final.
160
  
Similarly, in Colombia, collective dismissal requires prior authorisation from the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The Ministry of Labour should decide on 
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 s 2f Termination of Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) Act: cited in supra.  
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the matter within two months.
161




Such notification is in alignment with international labour standards. Article 14 of 
ILO Convention 158
163
 makes provision for the ‘competent authority’ to be notified 
in ‘accordance with national law and practice… as early as possible’. The ILO 
instrument requires employers to give the authority ‘relevant information, including 
a written statement of the reasons for termination, number and categories of workers 
likely to be affected and period over which it is to be carried out’.   
However, according to Rubin, Article 14 of the Convention does not specify 
exactly when notification should be made, ie during or after consultation.
164
 
Notification is generally intended to inform the authority of contemplated 
terminations that might cause economic problems and place a burden on public 




In the event of non-compliance with consultation and notification procedures, 
legislation and collective agreements generally make provisions for various forms of 
sanction that can be applied cumulatively, such as fines, compensation or even 
invalidation of the termination of employment. In some countries, authorisation of 
the competent authority will be refused if the legal provisions have not been met.
166
 
Notification of the administrative authority for collective or any other dismissals is 
not required in South Africa (under the LRA) except in the retrenchment of miners. 
In this instance, miners are afforded special protection under the Mineral and 
                                               
161 Colombia: s 66 of the Labour Code, Act 50 of 1990: cited in ILO Digest, op cit at 115. 
162
 If the undertaking has taxable liquid assets of less than 1,000 minimum monthly wages, the 
amount of compensation is 50 per cent of that sum: cited in supra. 
163
 ILO Convention 158: Division B. Notification to the Competent Authority, Article 14 (1):When 
the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or 
similar nature, he shall notify, in accordance with national law and practice, the competent authority 
thereof as early as possible, giving relevant information, including a written statement of the reasons 
for terminations, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which 
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national laws or regulations. 
164
 Rubin, op cit 542 at para 1. 
165
 Ibid at para 5. 
166 Ibid at para 9. 
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Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (s 52).
167
 Under this Act, when 
the ‘holder of a mining right’
168
 contemplates retrenchment of ‘10 per cent of the 
workforce or more than 500 employees’
169
 (s 52b) they must notify the Minerals and 
Mining Development Board.
170
 The Board will then investigate the ‘circumstances’ 
and ‘socio-economic and labour implications’ of the proposal and make 
recommendations to the Minister of Minerals and Energy under s 52(2) of the Act. 
The Minister, on the recommendation of the Board and after consultation with the 
Minister of Labour and Trade Unions, will make a directive under s 57(3) of the Act 
to the holder of the mining right. The employer then must comply with this directive 
and confirm in writing that the measures have been taken. If the directive is not 
complied with, the Minister of Minerals and Energy can apply to a court for the 
judicial management of the mining operation under s 52(b)-(c) of the Act. While this 
procedure is comparatively onerous for employers, it is in alignment with 
international labour standards.  
Generally, in South Africa, s 189 of the Act leaves consultation up to the affected 
parties. However, s 189A(3) of the LRA allows both sides involved in large-scale 
                                               
167
 s 52 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (2002), Notice of profitability and 
curtailment of mining operations affecting employment. (1) The holder of a mining right must, after 
consultation with any registered trade union or affected employees or their nominal representatives 
where there is no such trade union, notify the Board. 
168
 s 1 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,  Definitions (1) ‘holder’, in relation 
to a prospecting right, mining right, mining permit, retention permit, exploration right, production 
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‘mining right’ means a right to mine granted in terms of s23 (1) 
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10 per cent or more of the labour force or more than 500 employees, whichever, is the less, are likely 
to be retrenched in any 12-month period (2) the Board must, after consultation with the relevant 
holder investigate – (a) the circumstances referred to in subsection 1 and (b) the socio-economic and 
labour implications thereof and make recommendations to the Minister. 3 (a) The Minister may, on 
the recommendation of the Board and after consultation with the Minister of Labour any registered 
trade union or affected person or their nominated representatives where there is no such trade union, 
direct in writing that the holder of the mining right in question take such corrective measures subject 
to such terms and condition as the minister may determine  (b) the holder of the mining right must 
comply with the directive and confirm it in writing that the corrective measures have been taken. (c) If 
the directives contemplated in paragraph (a) are not complied with, the Minister may provide 
assistance or apply to a court for judicial management of the mining operation. 
170 established by s 57 of Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (2002). 
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dismissals to request facilitation under the auspices of the CCMA.
171
 As noted above, 
however, nearly a third of such facilitations are requested by employers. In closing, it 
should be stressed that the role of the CCMA is only to facilitate a ‘consensus-
seeking process’ not to arbitrate – although the proceedings are conducted on a ‘with 
prejudice basis’.  
The powers and duties of a facilitator are laid out in s 4 of Facilitation Regulations. 
However, if there is a dispute about disclosure of information, the facilitator may 
make an order directing an employer to produce documents that are relevant under  
s 5 of the Regulations.  A facilitator cannot impose any ruling in terms of a 
settlement. The matter can only become a dispute if at the end of 60 days an 
agreement cannot be reached. If the matter goes to court, no person may call a 




Research of ILO source material and analysis of ILO instruments on termination of 
employment dispel the myth that South African legislation for dismissal based on 
operational requirements is unique, unduly onerous and over-regulated for employers.  
Evidence shows that the perceived constraints of mandatory consultation arising 
from the LRA are vastly over-stated. The consultation process may be onerous for 
employers (ie ‘difficult to do, or needing a lot of effort’
173
) but not unduly so – ie ‘to 
a level which is more than necessary, acceptable or reasonable’.
174
 The South 
African statute does not, as often stated, put a bar on job creation, downsizing, 
efficiency or competitiveness.  
It should be emphasised that much of South Africa’s law for dismissal based on 
operational requirements (and that of our global competitors), is imported from ILO 
Convention 158 and ILO Recommendation 166. These international instruments 
                                               
171 In the UK, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) offers facilitation, but both 
parties must accept the service for it to take place. In South Africa only one party need request the 
statutory offer from the CCMA.  
172
 s 7 Facilitation Regulations (2003): Status of facilitation proceedings, (1) A facilitation is 
conducted on a with prejudice basis (2) Despite sub-regulation (1) the parties may agree in writing 
that a part of the facilitation is to be conducted on a without prejudice basis (3) the part of the 
facilitation conducted on a without prejudice basis may not be disclosed in any court proceedings.   
173
 Definition of ‘onerous’: Cambridge Dictionary Online. 
174 Definition of ‘unduly’: idem. 
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have served not only as a template or guide for South African lawmakers, but also 
for many others jurisdictions.  
For example, the LRA’s justification of dismissal uses the same universal 
terminology and concepts as that of the ILO, circa Geneva 1982-1985. This 
legislative appropriation of ILO standards is particularly apparent in the LRA’s s 213 
definition of operational requirements. It transpires that the concept is supra-national 
but was left undefined by the ILO and only explained at a conference. It was this 
explanation that was incorporated lock, stock and barrel into South African law.  
South Africa’s national definition may be, in the opinion of many legal practitioners, 
bad, ugly and in need of clarification, but it is no more onerous than those of many 
other jurisdictions, of which it is a clone. The same construct has been more or less 
universally adopted from the ILO. As such and in its existing form, it gives 
employers ample flexibility to make the business decisions of their choice.  
Analysis of ILO instruments also shows that South Africa’s eloquently written 
objectives of consultation in s 189(2) of the LRA are little more than a codification 
of ILO standards. All the consultation measures dramatically referred to as ‘the 
employers’ burden’ in our leading text books are directly imported from ILO 
Convention 158 and Recommendation 166.  
South Africa, it transpires, has not reinvented the wheel when it comes to labour 
law for dismissal based on operational requirements, just reshaped a couple of 
spokes. A more unique part of the LRA is s 189(3)(a)-(j) with its built-in, step-by-
step approach to written notice. While well-crafted, even ingenious with its 
provisions for swift disclosure, this subsection is still essentially a codification of 
ILO Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 – albeit an inspired one. The 
substantive detail of the LRA subsection contains no new elements and just gives 
effect to South Africa’s national obligations as a member of the ILO under s 1(b) of 
the LRA and to fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution.   
By contrast, s 189A of the LRA is truly innovative with its process-driven 
requirements for facilitation under the auspices of the CCMA in large-scale disputes. 
Each question on form LRA 7.20 contains a request for further and better disclosures, 
which are bound to be of assistance to a facilitator and the parties in finding their 
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way to an appropriate solution.
175
 Paradoxically, this notionally more regulatory part 
of the Act is not perceived as onerous by business and is requested by at least 30 per 
cent of South African employers contemplating dismissal based on operational 
requirements. The amendment appears to have been a huge success since its 
inception six years ago and has apparently saved thousands of jobs with its creative 
solutions for finding alternative employment. Although this part of the LRA gives a 
more generous interpretation to ILO Recommendation 166 than the legislation of 
many other countries, it is still in alignment with international standards. Section 
189A should be regarded as our own, home-grown model of best international 
practice. 
More of a burden (ie ‘difficult or unpleasant’
176
) for South African employers is 
the non-original s 189 of the LRA and its general application of consultation 
procedures for small and medium-sized businesses. While there may be valid 
arguments that the consultation requirements of s 189(3) of the LRA can sometimes 
be too onerous for small employers, comparative analysis of the law in different 
jurisdictions should not be used to whitewash over a dual system of labour relations 
that excluded Africans from the statutory definition of employee for more than half a 
century. The selective application of employment rights has no place in the modern 
South Africa and is out of alignment with the country’s Constitutional and national 
principles of social justice for all.  
Moreover, comparative research of the law in other countries illustrates that where 
limitations on employment rights are selectively applied, they are usually 
underpinned by income protection in the form of social security – almost non-
existent in South Africa. The prime financial protection South African employees 
have against retrenchment is severance pay and even this is comparatively low and 
more limited than in many other jurisdictions.  
The currency of mutual persuasion, formidable as it may seem to the uninitiated, is 
an international norm based upon tripartite participation through social dialogue and 
self-regulation. The obligation to consult is part of a new generation of rights (based 
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on a culture of justification of action when the loss of livelihood is anticipated) that 
emerged throughout the world in the 1990s. 
The LRA’s provisions in s 189 are in full alignment with those of most of South 
Africa’s global competitors and with prevailing international labour standards. In 
some instances – most notably those of rehiring, severance pay and notification of 
the administrative authorities – the national statute gives South African employers 
comparatively more flexibility than those in many others jurisdictions. 
For example, South African employers are given pretty much a free hand to make 
the employment decisions of their choice when it comes to selecting who is to be 
retrenched, or who is to be rehired if business improves. In addition, there is no 
statutory notification of the administrative authorities in South Africa except in the 
retrenchment of miners.  
In the final analysis, it is hard to see how the LRA and BCEA can be thought of as 
unduly onerous for employers in South Africa, when the legislation stops short of 
hitting them where it hurts most – their bank balances. Consultation may be 
formidable, challenging, time-consuming and complex for employers, but ultimately 
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